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COMMENT
USE OF CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF A
CODEFENDANT IN WASHINGTON
CHARLES W ELICKER I1
As a general proposition, anything that a party to an action has
voluntarily said at any time, if relevant, will be admissible against him.
In the case of two types of such statements, ordinary direct admissions
and voluntary confessions, the legal principles and rationales under-
lying their admissibility are so well-recognized and self-evident as to
occasion little confusion and less need for comment. However, in cases
where a person is sought to be charged with a statement made by
someone else (the so-called implied or adoptive admissions and the
various types of vicarious admissions), the underlying rationalizations
and applications of the rules are more difficult and subtle, although
equally valid and well-recognized.
Adoptive admissions are those statements which a person "adopts"
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as his own through his conduct-in most instances, through his silence.
If a statement inimicable to the interests of a person is made in that
person's presence, under such circumstances that, were it untrue, he
would deny it, the person's nondenial will be deemed a tacit admission
of the truth of the statements alleged against him. In State v McCut-
lum' the defendant was forced by police officers to sit and listen to a
confession being made by the man alleged to be his confederate. The
defendant made no comment either affirming or denying the state-
ments. The court felt that, under the circumstances, the defendant
could not be charged with having adopted the other's confession. In a
later case, State v. McKenzze,2 the court laid down the following rule,
which seems logical and not unduly harsh. "The silence of an accused
under arrest is not to be taken as a tacit admission of accusatory state-
ments made in his presence, but if he makes an equivocal reply or one
susceptible of being interpreted as an admission, the statement and
answer or comment may be admitted."3 These general observations as
to adoptive admissions are presented here in their criminal aspect, but
similar rules apply to civil actions."
Vicarious admissions differ from adoptive admissions in several
important particulars. Here the key word is "privity" The theory is
that, under some circumstances, the declarant and the person sought
to be charged are so united in design, purpose, obligation, title, or
interest that it would not be unfair or illogical to consider the act or
statement of the declarant as the act or statement of the person sought
to be charged, even though the latter was not present when the state-
men was being made and was perhaps unaware that it was being made.
The courts speak here in terms of each of the persons having a like
motive to tell the truth, and it would seem that in the situations to
which applications of the rule are restricted, (principal-agent, co-
1 18 Wash. 394, 51 Pac. 1044 (1897)
2 184 Wash. 32, 49 P.(2d) 1115 (1935).
3 This rule has not had easy sailing in recent years. In State v. Redwine, 23
Wn.(2d) 467, 161 P.(2d) 205 (1945), (noted in 20 WASH. L. REv. 234), the court
reaffirmed the rule announced in the McKenme case, assuming in the opinion, argvendo.
that the defendant was under arrest, and held that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of accusatory statements toward the defendant. However, the court refused to
reverse and held (four judges dissenting) that it would not reverse in such cases unless
it appeared to the court on appeal that the exclusion of the evidence would probably
have resulted in a different verdict. In State v. Robinson, 24 Wn. (2d) 909, P. (2d)
986 (1946), upon more mature consideration the court overruled the Redzune case,
and in the last word on the subject, State v. Bauers, 25 Wn.(2d) 825, 172 P.(2d)
279 (1946), the rule of the McKenzie case was again affirmed.
4 Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.(2d) 1113 (1939), wherein the court recognizes
the adoptive admissions rule in civil cases.
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pronnsors, joint tort-feasors, co-conspirators, etc.), the reasoning is
sound enough. Although this discussion will be concerned principally
with the admissibility of declarations of codefendants and co-conspira-
tors in criminal cases, it should be noted that the rules developed apply
equally to civil cases, and in particular to those involving joint tort-
feasors.5
In the recent case of State v. Goodwn the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington had occasion to review many of its prior decisions on several of
these points, and arrived at some interesting results. Goodwin and
another were jointly charged and tried for larceny It appeared that
the other accused had confessed, and his confession was read in evi-
dence, at which time counsel for Goodwin objected ,to its admission
unless the jury be instructed that it was not to be considered against
Goodwin. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that it
would admit the exhibit for all purposes. Upon appeal the court re-
viewed eleven of its prior decisions, found them to be inconsistent, and,
reversing and granting a new trial, stated the rule to be:
Confessions of one defendant jointly tried with another may be introduced
in evidence, but-in such cases the defendant or defendants who did not
make the confession should be protected by proper statements to the jury
that the confession should only be considered against him or them.
The court then overruled, without enumeration, "the cited cases which
laid down the rule contrary to the one just announced." In addition the
court noted that neither the crime of conspiracy as defined by the
statute nor the common law crime of conspiracy had been charged,
and then added at the very end of the opinion this rather cryptic state-
ment: "This holding is not intended to apply to cases in which the
crime of conspiracy has been charged and a proper foundation has
been laid for the introduction of the statements of a co-conspirator."
The result reached by the court in this case seems logical and sound.
It goes without saying that the admissions of a defendant are not
admissible against his codefendant solely by virtue of their position as
coparties in the trial.8 As to the nonconfessing defendant, the other's
confession is pure hearsay, and there is also the strong possibility that
5See, e.g., Sova v. First National Bank of Ferndale, 18 Wn. (2d) 88, 138 P. (2d)
181 (1943), a civil conspiracy case, wherein the court announces a rule as to the admis-
sibility of the statements of co-conspirators identical with the rule applied in criminal
cases.
029 Wn.(2d) 276, 186 P.(2d) 935 (1947).
-REM. REV. STAT. § 2382 [P P C. § 113-99].
s WIMORE, EVIDENCE § 1076 (3rd ed. 1940).
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the confessing codefendant is attempting to exculpate himself at the
expense of his nonconfessing codefendant or to convince the authorities
that he was the dupe of a more culpable participant.9 As satisfactory
as is the result at which the court arrived in the Goodwin case, a result
which, according to the virtually unanimous voice of the authorities, is
correct and orthodox, 0 yet the process employed by the court in
arriving at that result may be questionable. For purposes of clarity in
attempting to analyze this process, the eleven cases cited by the court
in arriving at its decision will be discussed in three groups: (a) Con-
fessions of a Codefendant, (b) Confession of a Principal on the Trial
of the Accessory, and (c) Statements of Co-conspirators.
(a) Confessions of Codefendants. Four of the cases discussed by the
court are precisely in point." In each of these the confession of one
defendant was sought to be used against his codefendant, and in each
of them the court either ruled or expressly assumed that such evidence
could not be so used, but that, in the event of a joint trial, the confes-
sion may be admitted in evidence, provided the jury is instructed to
use it only against the person making it. In State v. McCullum" the
court found that McCullum had not adopted his alleged confederate's
confession, and, accordingly, reversed the trial court for admitting it in
evidence against the, defendant. In State v. Tommy" Tommy's co-
defendant had confessed to the murder and evidence of that confession
was admitted. Error was predicated on the fact that the trial court's
instructions did not mention that the confession could not be used
against Tommy On appeal the court assumed that the confession
could not be used against Tommy, but did not reverse, since the court
felt that the trial court's instructions on the point had been reasonably
clear, and, in addition, the state had expressly disavowed any use of it
9 See, e.g., State v. Clark, 156 Wash. 47, 286 Pac. 69 (1930), where the confessing
codefendant was acquitted of first-degree murder and found guilty of only second-degree murder by the same jury which found her codefendant (who in this case was
actually bordering on feeble-mindedness) guilty of first-degree murder.
10 McKELvEY, EvIDENCE 151 (5th ed. 1944). Also the leading case of Sparf v.
United States, 156 U. S. 51, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1894), where the court laid down the fol-lowing rule at page 56 "After the conspiracy has come to an end the admissions of
one conspirator by way of narrative of past facts are not admissible in evidence against
the others. The same rule is applicable where the evidence does not show that the
killing was pursuant to a conspiracy, but yet was by the joint act of the defendants."
11These are. State v. McCullum, 18 Wash. 394, 51 Pac. 1044 (1897) State v.Tommy, 19 Wash. 270, 53 Pac. 157 (1898), State v. Ashe, 182 Wash. 598, 48 P.(2d)
213 (1935) , State v. Crossman, 189 Wash. 124, 63 P.(2d) 934 (1937). State v. Beebe,
66 Wash. 463, 120 Pac. 122 (1912) is possibly in point, but the result reached in that
case is also consistent with the Goodu.nn case, as will be pointed out later.
"2 Note 11, supra.
i Note 11, supra.
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against Tommy In State v. Aske"4 Ashe's codefendant, one Head, had
made damaging admissions to a police officer after his arrest. Although
Head did not testify, the officer testified as to these admissions, which
implicated Ashe and were demed by him. Upon appeal the court held
the evidence to be admissible, saying by way of dictum that the evi-
dence would probably have been inadmissible had Ashe been on trial
alone. While the result announced in the Ashe case seems at first sight
to be inconsistent with the rule as declared in the Goodwin case, a
careful reading of Judge Stemert's concurring opinion in the Ashe case
reveals that the record sent to the Supreme Court showed that the
statement by Head was admitted in evidence as to him only. As Judge
Stemert put it: "Were this made to appear in the opinion, there would
be no violation of the rule." In State v. Crossmah,'5 in a joint trial for
larceny where one of the defendants had confessed, the court held it
proper to read the entire confession to the jury if the trial court in-
structs the jury that the confession can be considered -only against the
person making it.
It is apparent that these four cases are orthodox and consistent.
Hence, it will be necessary to examine the remaining seven cases in an
effort to determine whence arose the apparent inconsistency
(b) Confession of the Principal on the Trial of the Accessory. In
three of the cases cited by the court, the confession of one codefendant
was used against another."0 Although seemingly inconsistent with the
Goodwin case, the results in those cases can be reconciled with the rule
as laid down in that case, but this can be done only in the light of the
historical background relative to principals and accessories. From a
time prior to any of the cases here under consideration the distinction
between principals and accessories before the fact had been abolished
in Washington.' The statute abolishing this distinction declares that
all persons shall be proceeded against and punished as principals. "
This statutory language notwithstanding, there still remain in this
state the common law distinctions relative to the commission of the
act, the language of the indictment or information, and the proof at the
trial. According to the construction placed on our statute by the Wash-
ington court the prosecution must establish two essential and inde-
1 Note 11, supra.
15 Note 11, supra.
10 These are: State v. Mann, 39 Wash. 144, 81 Pac. 561 (1905), State v. Vane, 105
Wash. 421, 177 Pac. 728 (1919), State v. Lyda, 129 Wash. 298, 225 Pac. 55 (1924).
17 See, e.g., Rem. and Ball. Code of 1897, § 6782.
Is REm. Rav. STAT. § 2260; [P P C. § 112-13].
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pendent facts on either the joint or separate trial of one who is actually
an accessory before the fact: 9 (i) that the defendant's principal com-
nutted this crime; (2) that this defendant-accessory aided and abetted
him. Thus it can be seen that in a very real sense the guilt of the acces-
sory is predicated upon the guilt ot the alleged principal. This means
that the prosecution must convince this jury that the alleged principal
has committed the crime charged, and the fact that another jury has
acquitted the principal does not operate as a bar to the trial of the
accessory 20 But if the principal and the accessory are tried jointly, it
would seem that the jury would not be permitted to acquit the principal
and convict the accessory, for if the principal is not guilty as charged,
then neither can the accessory be guilty as charged.
With this in mind the Washington court has held that any evidence
tending to show that the principal has in fact committed the crime and
which would be admissible against the principal on his separate trial is
admissible against the accessory, whether he be tried jointly or sepa-
rately "o As to whether a judgment of conviction against the principal
could be used for this purpose would depend on the court's interpreta-
tion of the law of judgments, but, by analogy, if acquittal of the prin-
cipal is not proof of his innocence, conviction of the principal would
probably not be proof of his guilt, although it might be prima facie
evidence of that fact. Be that as it may, it is clear that the confession
of the principal would be admissible evidence of his guilt on the acces-
sory's trial.2 But it must be remembered that this confession is not
being admitted for all purposes, not for the purpose of showing that
this defendant aided and abetted, but solely for the purpose of showing
that someone else, %.e., the principal, has committed a crime, and the
jury ought to be so instructed. Consider for a moment the complicated
situation arising when the principal and his accessory are tried jointly
and the principal has confessed. In such an instance the court would
have to instruct the jury that it might consider the confession as evi-
dence of the guilt of the principal, but insofar as the accessory's guilt
was concerned, the confession could only be considered on the issue
of the commission of a crime. It is evident that here there is substan-
tial danger of misuse of the evidence by the jury Our court has recog-
nized this. and in State v Lyda,2 where a witness was testifying to a
19 State v. Nikolich, 137 Wash. 62, 241 Pac. 664 (1925).
20 State v. Gifford, 19 Wash. 464, 53 Pac. 709 (1898)
21 State v. Mann, note 16, supra.
22 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1079(c) (3rd ed. 1940).
23 Note 16, supra.
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confession made by the alleged principal, the court, granting that the
evidence was admissible and of probative value insofar as the issue of
the commission of a crime was concerned, insisted that the witness
make no unnecessary reference to the defendant-accessory, pointing
out the obvious fact that what the principal told the witness regarding
the accessory's aiding and abetting was madmissible hearsay
Two other cases cited by the court m the Goodwin case fall into the
principal-accessory pattern. In State v. Mann,2 the first of these cases
where this point was raised, a husband was being separately tried for
aiding and abetting his wife in burning the family barn for the insur-
ance money The trial court admitted evidence of the confession of the
wife to the crime. The defendant objected on the ground that the con-
spiracy had come to an end when she made those statements, and that,
accordingly, their admission could not be justified under the so-called
"conspiracy rule." The court met this objection by declaring that con-
spiracy wasn't involved in the slightest and that this evidence was
admissible on the issue of whether or not the wife had burned the barn.
This case was thought to be mconsistent with the Goodwin case, and
was apparently overruled, as was the case of State v. Vane," where the
facts brought the case within the principal-accessory pattern, the court
admitting the principal's confession on the accessory's separate trial.
(c) Statements of Co-conspirators. There yet remain four cases for
consideration. " In each of these cases the problem is not that of the
admissibility of the confession of anyone, but rather the admissibility
of the statements of a certain class of persons, namely, those who are
co-conspirators with the defendant on trial. The general rule relative
to such evidence has been succinctly stated as follows:
Where there is evidence tending to show a community of design between
two or more persons for the performance of an unlawful act, the acts or
statements of one conspirator spoken or performed in furtherance of the
objects of such conspiracy are admissible in evidence in a prosecution
against another of the conspirators for the offense alleged to have resulted
therefrom, although such statements were made out of the presence of the
particular defendant on trial.27
24 Note 16, supra.
25 Note 16, supra.
26 These cases are. State v. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 Pac. 157 (1895), State v.
Dilley, 44 Wash. 207, 87 Pac. 133 (1906), State v. Williams, 62 Wash. 286, 113 Pac.
780 (1911), State v. Beebe, 66 Wash. 463, 120 Pac. 122 (1912).
27 ABBo'rs CprINAL TRIAL PRACTICE 1133 (4th ed. 1939).
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This is a rule which is universally recognized as sound and logical. 8
By the better, and majority, view conspiracy need not be formally
charged in the pleadings in order for the prosecution to invoke the
benefit of this rule of evidence, but it is sufficient if a conspiracy be
shown to exist in fact or be developed by the proof.29 This was the
view of the Washington court in State v. Williams.0 It is of interest to
note that the Model Code of Evidence broadens the above-quoted rule
considerably and does away with the "in furtherance of the conspir-
acy" requirement.81 The question of the actual existence of the con-
spiracy is one of fact for the jury "2 The prosecution must make out
a prima facie showing of conspiracy to the satisfaction of the trial
judge (not, as the defendant contended in State v. McGonigle," beyond
a reasonable doubt), and then may bring in evidence of the declara-
tions and acts of the co-conspirators." In his discretion the trial judge
may admit evidence of the declarations of the alleged co-conspirators
before sufficient proof of the conspiracy is given, the state undertaking
to furnish such proof at a subsequent stage of the trial.88 The jury is
to be told what a conspiracy is, that it does not necessarily mean a
formal agreement among the parties, that it is often incapable of direct
proof and may be established by circumstantial evidence, and then the
jury is permitted to decide whether such circumstances exist that an
unlawful combination may be inferred." If the jury so finds, it may
then consider the declarations against all the members of the con-
spiracy Where the alleged conspiracy was carried into effect by the
acts of a riotous assembly or seditious society, one who is shown to be
associated with or a member of the mob or society will be charged with
28 McKELVwY, EVIDENCE 151 (5th ed. 1944) In fact the rule is embodied in some
state statutes, e.g., Ore. Comp. Laws (Ann.) § 2-28, 1940. California and Montana
have like provisions.
29 The cases are collected in 66 A. L. R. 1311.30 62 Wash. 286, 113 Pac. 780 (1911).
81 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 508. "Evidence of a hearsay declaration
is admissible against a party to the action if the judge finds that:-(b) the party and
the declarant were participants in a plan to commit a crime or civil wrong and the
hearsay declaration was relevant to the plan or its subject matter and was made while
the plan was in existence and before its execution was complete."
Comment on Clause (b) Clause (b) does not accept the rule as generally stated
with reference to declarations of co-conspirators and willful tortfeasors, which holds
the declarations inadmissible unless made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
32 State v. Dilley, 44 Wash. 207, 87 Pac. 133 (1906) , State v. Dix, 33 Wash. 405,
74 Pac. 570 (1903).
33 144 Wash. 252, 258 Pac. 16 (1927)
34 State v. Wappenstem, 67 Wash. 502, 121 Pac. 989 (1912)
35 State v. Dilley, note 26, supra, and State v. Wappenstem, note 34, .supra.
36 State v. McCann, 16 Wash. 249, 47 Pac. 443 (1896) Also State v. Dilley, note 26,
supra, and State v. Wappenstem, note 34, supra.
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the statements of all the persons in the mob or society, whether identi-
fied or not."'
It is interesting to note at this point that the court, in at least two
instances, has somewhat enlarged the normal conception of the word
"conspiracy" In State v. Dilley"s the state sought to introduce in evi-
dence incriminating notes apparently passed between two of the
defendants after their arrest. This was permitted by the court on the
theory that "the conspiracy comprehended not only the actual offense
of robbery, but from the beginning extended to and included a common
design or scheme to fabricate a defense," and, since under this inter-
pretation the notes were in furtherance of the conspiracy, they were
admissible. In State v. Larson," where three persons were jointly
charged with larceny, the court admitted evidence of statements made
during the course of a quarrel arising out of the division of the loot,
since the court felt that the conspiracy included not only the obtaining
of the money but the division of it among the conspirators. Therefore
all that occurred with reference to a division of the money came prior
to the termination of the conspiracy and was admissible.40
It does not follow from this that a conspiracy will exist in every case
where two or more persons unite to commit a tort or crime. In State v.
Beebe,"1 where, in a boundary dispute, a mother and her daughter shot
their neighbor, the court was unable to "find in the record any evidence
tending to show concerted action on their part looking to the injury of
the deceased," and, hence, on the separate trial of the mother, refused
to admit evidence of prior statements made by the daughter.
With this background an analysis will now be made of the final four
cases cited by the court in the Goodwin case. It must be admitted that
87 WIGMaoR, EVIDENCE § 1079 (3rd ed. 1940). Also State v. Lowery, 104 Wash.
520, 177 Pac. 355 (1918), where pamphlets containing inflammatory IWW propaganda
were held to be admissible against one of its members on trial for criminal anarchy, the
theory being that they were statements of co-conspirators.
88 Note 26, mipra.
39 187 Wash. 96, 59 P.(2d) 1119 (1936).
40 The case of State v. Baker, 69 Wash. 589, 125 Pac. 1016 (1912), is of interest in
this connection. In that case the complaining witness was attacked by two female
robbers. A police officer answered is cries for help and apprehended one of the women,
instructing the prosecuting witness to hold her while he pursued the other woman. The
captured robber offered the complaining witness money to release her, which he
refused to do, whereupon she jabbed him with her hatpin and made her escape. On the
trial of the other woman the complaining witness was permitted to testify as to this
scene, and on appeal the court held this to be admissible, since "there was a concert
of action between the two women in the commission of the offense." It is at least argu-
able as to whether these statements were made during the life of and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
41 Note 26, supra.
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the opinion in State v. Payne42 is somewhat confusing, although the
result seems clear enough. In that case three men were jointly charged
with murder and given separate trials, and error was based upon the
fact that the trial court had permitted evidence to be introduced as to
the acts and statements of those joined with Payne at a time prior to
the assault. The court held the evidence to be admissible, announcing
three grounds for its decision, the third of which was that there had
been a clear showing of a concert of action to terrorize the citizens of
a town, and by reason of this concert of action between Payne and
those joined with him in the information the statements of one were
admissible against all. Although the word "conspiracy" is not men-
tioned here, it seems quite clear that the court was thinking in terms
of the conspiracy rule. The court in the Goodwin case listed State v.
Payne as reaching a result inconsistent with the rule there announced,
and, hence, apparently deemed it necessary to overrule it.
In State v. Dilley3 the defendants were jointly charged and tried
for robbery, the theory of the prosecution being that the defendants
had formed a conspiracy to rob the complaining witness. The court
was satisfied with the prima facie showing of conspiracy made out by
the state, and approved the admission of evidence of conversations
between one of the defendants and the complaining witness out of the
presence of the other defendants. It seems clear that the statements
were made in furtherance of the conspiracy and hence were rightly
admitted under the conspiracy rule. Here, too, the court in the Good-
win case apparently considered this case inconsistent and considered
it necessary to overrule it.
In State v. Williams"' there was a joint charge of larceny, with the
two defendants being tried separately On the trial of the one evidence
was admitted concerning conversations had between the other co-
indictee and the complaining witness, again out of the defendant's pres-
ence. Here, too, it seems clear that the statements were in furtherance
of the conspiracy, and the court so held, pointing out that, for the
purposes of this rule ot evidence, it makes no difference whether the
defendants are tried jointly or separately
Finally in State v Beebe" Mrs. Beebe and her daughter were jointly
charged and separately tried for murder. Although it would appear
42 Note 26, supra.
43 Note 26, supra.
44 Note 26, supra.
45 Note 26, supra.
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that Mrs. Beebe was actually an accessory, the court did not treat her
as such, stating that her guilt was in no wise dependent upon that of
her daughter, and approved her being tried as a principal."8 Evidence
was sought to be introduced of prior threats made by the daughter
toward the deceased and also of admissions by the daughter subsequent
to the crime. The court correctly pointed out that the daughter's sub-
sequent admissions were not admissible against her mother, a result
entirely consistent with the Goodwin case. However, with the follow-
mg statement the court refused to admit evidence of the prior threats:
"We are unable to find in the record any evidence tending to show con-
certed action on their part looking to the injury of the deceased." It
would seem to be almost necessarily mferrable from this that, had the
court been able to find evidence of concerted action, i.e., a conspiracy,
it would have admitted evidence of these prior threats.
Conclusion. Prior to the Goodwin case the state of the Washington
law relative to this problem seemed to be clear, well-settled, and
entirely consistent with the majority rules throughout the country, viz..
i. Generally speaking the confession of one defendant is not admis-
sible against another, although if jointly tried the confession is admis-
sible against the one making it, the jury being instructed as to its
limited use.
2. In cases where the proof shows that the defendant is in fact an
alder and abetter, though charged as a principal, the courts have
recogmzed that, to prove him guilty, his principal must also be shown
to be guilty, and thus have admitted evidence of the principal's guilt,
including his admissions and confessions, on this one narrow issue,
with proper limiting instructions.
3. If a conspiracy among several persons is shown to exist, even
though conspiracy is not charged or is not the gravamen of the offense,
the statements of one conspirator, made during the life of the conspir-
acy and in furtherance of its objects, are admissible against all his
co-conspirators. This rule by its very terms serves to exclude the post-
crime confessions of a co-conspirator.
What was the impact of the decision in the Goodwin case on this
apparently consistent and well-settled body of law? Of one thing we
48 Dean Wigmore, in Section 1077, criticizes the case as being unsound, stating that
in his opinion Mrs. Beebe was a true accessory before the fact, which would make the
prior threats and subsequent admissions admissible under the theory of State v. Mann,
note 16, supra. A reading of the charge as contained in the opinion would seem to lend
strong support to his views.
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can be certain, the confession of one defendant cannot be used sub-
stantively against his codefendant. But what is the meaning of the
court's statement at the end of the opinion to the effect that the rule
announced is not to apply in cases where conspiracy has been charged
and a proper foundation laid for the statements of co-conspirators?
Does it mean that the confession of conspirator, made after the con-
summation of the crime, will henceforth be adrmssible against his
co-conspirators if the prosecution charges and proves conspiracy? One
might easily deduce this, yet such a result would be contrary to all
modern authority Or does the statement mean that, in order to take
advantage of the conspiracy rule conspiracy must be formally charged
in the pleadings? If so, that too is a radical departure from prior deci-
sions and constitutes the adoption of a rule prevailing in only a small
minority of jurisdictions. And when the court overruled all inconsistent
cases did it mean to overrule the principal-accessory cases and those
cases involving conspiracy, which may seem at first sight to be incon-
sistent, but which are clearly not so? If so, this result would also seem
to be unsound and inconsistent with prevailing doctrine. Perhaps what
is intended is merely a clear caveat that the rule announced in the
Goodw n case is not to be deemed, without further consideration,
applicable to situations not presented in that case. So narrowly con-
sidered the holding itself on the facts of that case is orthodox enough
and consistent with the prior cases.
The University of Washington Law School takes pleasure in
announcing that Dean William L. Prosser, of the University of Cali-
fornia School of Jurisprudence, will be the speaker at the Annual
Law School Banquet, to be held in Seattle February 26, 1949.
